EXHIBIT N

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1
                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
2
   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
3
   450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 8000
   Washington, DC 20530
                                        Case No.
4
                                         1:23-cv-10511-
   COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
                                        WGY
5
   One Ashburton Place, 18th Floor
   Boston, MA 02108
6
   DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
7
   400 Sixth Street NW, Tenth Floor)
   Washington, DC 20001
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    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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    300 South Spring Street
    Suite 1702
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   Los Angeles, CA 90013
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    STATE OF MARYLAND
    200 St. Paul Place, 19th Floor
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   Baltimore, MD 21202
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    STATE OF NEW JERSEY
   124 Halsey Street - 5th Floor
14
   Newark, New Jersey
                         07102
15
    STATE OF NEW YORK
   28 Liberty Street, 20th Floor
New York, NY 10005
16
17
   and
   STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
18
    P.O. Box 629
19
   Raleigh, NC 27602
20
                   Plaintiffs,
            VS.
21
   JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION
    27-01 Queens Plaza North
22
   Long Island City, NY
                           11101
            and
23
   SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC.
   2800 Executive Way
24
   Miramar, FL 33025
25
                   Defendants.
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1 form. 2 THE WITNESS: Potentially. Tf it. 3 doesn't come at the -- at the expense of 4 harm somewhere else, then potentially. 5 And if it does, there's going to have to 6 be balancing, and that's not for me. 7 MR. MOORE: Ethan, we've been 8 going about an hour and 15 now. Are you 9 close to a breaking point? 10 MR. GLASS: Yeah, let me just 11 finish this up. 12 BY MR. GLASS: 13 So as an economist it would be Ο. 14 relevant to look at the effects, positive or 15 negative, of a merger outside of the relevant 16 antitrust markets, correct? 17 MOORE: Objection to the 18 form. 19 THE WITNESS: I think it's 2.0 important to identify the harms and the 2.1 benefits, and then let the trier of fact 22 weigh them in the way that he or she 23 might. 24 BY MR. GLASS: 25 And harms and benefits both Q.

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   inside and outside of the relevant antitrust
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   markets, correct?
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                   MR. MOORE: Objection to the
4
            form.
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                   THE WITNESS:
                                  Yeah, correct.
6
                   MR. GLASS: Let's go off the
7
            record.
8
                   THE VIDEOGRAPHER:
                                       Off the record
                       This ends media unit number
            at 2:56.
10
            four.
11
                    (Brief recess.)
12
                   THE VIDEOGRAPHER: On the record
13
                      This begins media unit number
            at 3:12.
14
            four in the deposition of Tasneem
15
            Chipty.
16
   BY MR. GLASS:
17
                   Okay, timely, sufficiency,
            0.
18
   likelihood.
19
                   So is there an objective measure
20
   of timeliness that an economist would apply to
21
   the entry analysis?
22
                   It's a good question.
                                            So as far
23
   as I understand and recall sitting here, the
24
   current merger quidelines don't actually have a
25
   specific threshold number. But in practice
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1 there's a price effect, and when there's 2 exit, there's a price effect. 3 prospect of entry is not always enough 4 to alleviate a concern of price effects. 5 BY MR. GLASS: 6 Not always enough but Ο. Got you. 7 in airlines the threat of entry could be enough 8 in some routes to keep prices at a competitive 9 level, correct? 10 MR. MOORE: Objection to the 11 form. 12 THE WITNESS: In principle, yes, 13 but from what I've seen on many routes 14 that's not been the case. 15 BY MR. GLASS: 16 So for entry to offset the Ο. 17 alleged competitive effects, we would not need 18 to completely replace Spirit on each and every 19 route; we would just need to be confident that 20 between replacing Spirit and the threat of 21 replacing Spirit that prices remain at a 22 competitive level; is that fair? 23 MR. MOORE: Objection to the 24 form. 25 So not quite. What THE WITNESS:

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you call the threat of entry has to be credible, and it has to be -- so meaning that if an airline really thought they wanted to enter, they could. It was like a feasible thing to do, they had, you know, airplanes and pilots, and they had gates, and they had all of the facilities they need to enter so that it's credible and that -- and that -- so that's one aspect of credible. Another aspect of credible is that it's truly -- it would make sense that this airline, these airlines, if

you have more than one in mind, would find it attractive to enter given their overall network strategy.

So if entry -- if the prospect of entry was credible, and it could happen quickly, then, yes, it's possible that you don't have to replace loss Spirit capacity one for one. It's possibly one of the reasons or one of the factors that you might read into some of the work that I did suggesting different adjustment factors to replacing Spirit